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Justice Hopkins and Restraints on the
Press
HON. FLOYD R. GIBSON*
Justice James D. Hopkins has long been a jurist of great
sensitivity to constitutional issues. His remarkable intellect and
discerning nature make him capable of anticipating decisions of
the United States Supreme Court. These traits are reflected in
an important decision rendered by Justice Hopkins in 1976, New
York Times Co. v. Starkey.'
Starkey involved a trial court's gag order in a sensational
criminal case. The court had ordered reporters for the New York
Times and New York Post not to report anything about the case
except what transpired in the courtroom. Justice Hopkins,
speaking for the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
Court, held that the order violated the first amendment. In 1983
that conclusion may seem fairly obvious, but Justice Hopkins'
decision preceded the line of cases beginning with Nebraska
Press Association v. Stuart" dealing with gag orders and court-
room closures. The principles of law laid down by Justice Hop-
kins in the Starkey case were echoed by the United States Su-
preme Court five months later in Nebraska Press and in 1980 in
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,3 and to a lesser extent
in 1982 in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court." In addition
to the Supreme Court's adoption of Starkey, courts both within
and outside of New York have cited Justice Hopkins' insightful
opinion.
The Starkey case grew out of a murder trial in Kings
County, New York. Six defendants were on trial for the May 23,
1973 murder of Philip Williams, and for kidnapping, robbery,
and burglary. On January 13, 1976, the first day of the trial, the
* Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
1. 51 A.D.2d 60, 380 N.Y.S.2d 239 (2d Dep't 1976).
2. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
3. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
4. 102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982).
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presiding judge admonished a reporter for the New York Times
and a reporter for the New York Post not to report anything
about the case except what transpired in the courtroom. The
judge told the reporters " 'not to go into any background at
a l l .' , ,5
Two days later the Times printed an article which referred
to a prior trial of five of the defendants in Nassau County in
which they were convicted of kidnapping and to the conviction
of two of the defendants for attempted murder. These convic-
tions stemmed from events which took place the same evening
as the alleged murder. The presiding judge told the reporters in
the courtroom that his admonition had been an order, not a re-
quest, and warned that future disregard thereof would lead to a
contempt citation. That afternoon the New York Times moved
to vacate or stay the order, which the trial judge denied. The
Times immediately thereafter, on January 15, 1976, commenced
proceedings in the appellate division. A member of the appellate
division denied the Times' request for a temporary restraining
order. Five days later the trial judge put his previous admoni-
tion in the form of a written order. The order forbade the New
York Times, the New York Post, the New York Daily News, and
the two reporters orginally in the courtroom from "printing and
publishing any criminal background on any or all of the defen-
dants herein and more particularly any matter against these de-
fendants herein and more particularly any matter against these
defendants in Nassau County pertaining to these defendants in
any proceeding arising out of the subject matter of the within
indictment . . ." On January 23, 1976, the Daily News also
moved for a stay of the trial judge's order. Just seven days later
Justice Hopkins issued his opinion vacating the oral and written
orders.
Justice Hopkins' concise, incisive opinion examined the in-
terrelationship between a free press and criminal justice and dis-
cussed preferred procedures for determining what actions should
be taken to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial. Justice
Hopkins recognized that "a responsible press has always been
5. New York Times Co. v. Starkey, 51 A.D.2d at 62, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 241. The facts
presented are drawn from the opinion of the appellate division.




regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration,
especially in the criminal field"; 7 he also recognized that "the
press is the instrument by which the public is informed of cur-
rent events."" He then concluded: "[O]nly the most exigent cir-
cumstances warrant the issuance of an order curtailing the right
of the press to publish."9 He summarized his position in typical
straightforward, forceful fashion: "[A]n order directing the press
not to publish the information ought to be the last resort of the
court."' 10
Justice Hopkins next examined the steps to be taken before
a trial court can conclude that the requisite exigent circum-
stances are present:
No invasion of the freedom of the press should be sanctioned un-
less it appears clearly on the record that the court has inquired
into the potential danger to the defendant if the prejudicial infor-
mation is published, that on substantial grounds it appears that
the defendant will be deprived of a fair trial as a result, and that
the danger cannot be avoided or minimized by other means, such
as by sequestering the jury, or through proper instructions to the
jury. 1
In the interest of "due process and the delicate accommodation
of the constitutional privileges," Justice Hopkins stated that the
trial court should make its inquiry before the trial and give no-
tice to the parties and the press.'2 Justice Hopkins emphasized
that court action will rarely be necessary. When he applied these
principles to the trial court's orders, he concluded that the or-
ders violated the first amendment and he vacated them.
When Justice Hopkins appropriately concluded that "an or-
der directing the press not to publish the information ought to
be the last report of the court," there was not much law from
the Supreme Court directly supporting his position. In Times-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. Schulingkamp,'s Justice Powell, sit-
7. Id. at 64, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 243, (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350
(1966)).
8. New York Times Co. v. Starkey, 51 A.D.2d at 64, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 243.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 64, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 243-44.
11. Id. at 64, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 243.
12. Id. at 64, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 244.




ting as a circuit justice, stayed a state trial court order which
imposed various restraints on reporting, including a ban on re-
porting what transpired in pretrial hearings, until after a jury
was selected. Except for this in-chambers opinion by a single
justice, the leading cases dealing with highly publicized trials
had found that the press was not adequately restricted. In Shep-
pard v. Maxwell,14 the Supreme Court held that Dr. Sam Shep-
pard had not received a fair trial on the charge of murdering his
wife, in part because "newsmen took over practically the entire
courtroom,"1 5 and the court should have adopted stricter rules
concerning the use of the courtroom by newsmen.1 6 In Estes v.
Texas,1 7 the Supreme Court held that permitting the televising
of trials denied due process.
Five months to the day after Justice Hopkins rendered his
Starkey decision, the Supreme Court likewise adopted a last re-
sort approach in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart.15 The
Supreme Court reviewed a gag order in a trial for the murder of
the six members of a rural Nebraska family in their home. The
order under review by the Supreme Court prohibited reporting
of confessions or admissions made by the accused or of facts
strongly implicative of the accused until the jury was impan-
eled.1 9 The order differed from the Starkey order in that it pro-
hibited dissemination of information obtained from judicial pro-
ceedings as well as other sources. The Supreme Court held that
the part of the order restraining information obtained in the
courtroom was clearly invalid;"0 the analysis went to that part of
the order directed at other information.
14. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
15. Id. at 355.
16. Id. at 358.
17. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
18. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
19. Id. at 545. This was the order as modified by the Nebraska Supreme Court. The
original order, issued by a county judge, prohibited everyone in attendance at a pretrial
hearing from releasing for public dissemination any testimony given or any evidence ad-
duced. Id. at 542. A state district judge modified the order, limiting its effect only until
the jury was impaneled, and prohibiting reporting of a confession by the accused, state-
ments the accused had made to others, a note he had written the night of the crime,
certain aspects of medical testimony, the identity of the victim of an alleged sexual as-
sault or the nature of the assault, and the exact nature of the restrictive order itself. Id.
at 543-44.




Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, in effect said
that an order directing the press not to publish information
should be the last resort. In applying the law to the facts of the
case," Chief Justice Burger concluded that the trial judge could
reasonably find a danger to the accused's fair trial right,22 but
the record did not support an implicit finding that less restric-
tive alternatives were inadequate. Such less restrictive alterna-
tives could have included a change of venue, a postponement of
the trial, a searching voir dire, emphatic jury instructions to con-
sider only courtroom evidence, and sequestration of jurors.23
Chief Justice Burger also said it was unclear whether the gag
order would have protected the accused's right24 and further-
more, the order was vague.25 The Chief Justice concluded: "We
cannot say on this record that alternatives to a prior restraint on
petitioners would not have sufficiently mitigated the adverse ef-
fects of pretrial publicity so as to make prior restraint unneces-
sary." " Justice Hopkins' interpretation of the law, which he de-
livered in Starkey just two weeks after the case came to his
court, had been adopted by the Supreme Court.27
The other major point that Justice Hopkins made in Star-
key was the need for a record to justify a restraint. In Nebraska
Press the Supreme Court closely examined the record to deter-
mine whether the gag order was justified.2" Later Supreme Court
cases in a slightly different context have emphasized how essen-
tial findings on the record are to a restriction on press access to
21. Id. at 562-70.
22. Id. at 562-63.
23. Id. at 563-64.
24. Id. at 565-67.
25. Id. at 568.
26. Id. at 569. Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion joined by Justices Stewart
and Marshall, would oppose any gag orders. They felt alternatives would always be ade-
quate. Id. at 572-73, 588 (Brennan, J., concurring).
27. The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the Nebraska Press principle in
Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (per curiam). Last year
the Supreme Court reiterated the last resort rule in a slightly different context. In Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982), the Court invalidated a Massa-
chusetts statute that mandated closed courtrooms during the testimony of a minor who
was a victim of a sexual assault. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, stated that
there must be a case-by-case determination of whether the state's interest in protecting a
minor's well-being necessitates closure. Id. at 2621.




courtroom information. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Vir-
ginia" makes clear that before a trial can be closed to the press
and public, the trial judge must articulate in findings the over-
riding interests requiring closure. In Richmond Newspapers a
trial judge had closed a murder trial. The plurality opinion of
Chief Justice Burger held that the first amendment right of ac-
cess to trials was violated because the trial judge had not recog-
nized the existence of the right, had not inquired into alterna-
tives, and had made no findings to support closure.30
It is not surprising that Justice Hopkins' Starkey opinion,
the harbinger of Supreme Court cases on the subject of gag or-
ders, has been cited by courts even outside the State of New
York. The Supreme Court of Ohio relied heavily on Starkey in
invalidating a gag order in a case it decided shortly before the
Nebraska Press decision was rendered. In State ex rel. Beacon
Journal Publishing Co. v. Kainrad,31 two persons accused of
participating in a murder were granted separate trials. One de-
fendant's trial began on January 26, 1976, and the other trial
was to begin before another judge on February 9, 1976. Shortly
after the first trial began, the judge who was to preside at the
second trial entered an order prohibiting the press from report-
ing statements made at the first trial concerning the second de-
fendant. In analyzing the first amendment claim of a newspaper,
the Ohio Supreme Court observed that the instant case was di-
rectly on point with Starkey and quoted extensively from it.
That court particularly emphasized Justice Hopkins' proclama-
tion that "[a]ll other measures within the power of the court to
29. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
30. 448 U.S. at 580-81. When Richmond Newspapers is compared to Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), the requirement of findings may be the major principle
of Richmond Newspapers. The Court in Gannett held that closure of a pretrial hearing
did not violate whatever first amendment rights a news organization had. Id. at 392. The
trial court in Gannett, like the trial court in Richmond Newspapers, did not inquire into
alternatives to closure, Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 55 A.D.2d 107, 110, 389 N.Y.S.2d 719,
723 (4th Dep't 1976), so perhaps it is the requirement of findings that distingiushes
Richmond Newspapers from Gannett. Chief Justice Burger distinguished Richmond
Newspapers from Gannett on the basis that Gannett involved pretrial proceedings.
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. at 564 (emphasis added). No justice
had joined the Chief Justice's concurrence in Gannett, which mentioned the relevance of
the fact that pretrial proceedings were involved. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at
394 (Burger, C.J., concurring).




insure a fair trial must be found to be unavailing or defi-
cient. . . .In short, an order directing the press not to publish
the information ought to be the last resort of the court." 2 The
Beacon Journal case was a four-to-three decision, but the basis
of the dissenting opinion was that the issue was moot; none of
the justices took issue with Justice Hopkins' analysis."3
In an Iowa Supreme Court case, Des Moines Register &
Tribune Co. v. Osmundson," a trial judge had restrained all per-
sons from revealing identities of jurors in a murder trial. In an
opinion effectively vacating the order, the Iowa Supreme Court
observed that Starkey had applied the Nebraska Press test even
before the decision was rendered.3 5
In New York Times Co. v. Starkey, Justice Hopkins wres-
tled with a difficult, and at that time unchartered, constitutional
issue. Courts have long tried to resolve the conflicts in our sys-
tem between the rights of a fair trial and a free press. 6 I have
personally dealt with that issue myself.3 7 Justice Hopkins' opin-
ion in this area of competing constitutional values of free press
and fair trial is commendable. The opinion is particularly praise-
worthy because he rendered an excellent opinion in less than
two weeks. It is a comment both on his intellectual capacity and
his diligence that he was able to produce that perceptive opinion
in a matter of days. Perhaps Justice Hopkins shared the feeling
about prior restraints on the press that was expressed by Justice
Black in the Pentagon Papers8 case: "[E]very moment's contin-
uance of the injunctions against these newspapers amounts to a
flagrant, indefensible, and continuing violation of the First
Amendment. '" 9
I have long known Justice Hopkins as an outstanding jurist
and scholar. His opinion in New York Times Co. v. Starkey rep-
32. Id. at 354, 348 N.E.2d at 698.
33. Id. at 359, 348 N.E.2d at 701 (Corrigan, J., dissenting).
34. 248 N.W.2d 493 (Iowa 1976).
35. Id. at 500.
36. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 547-51 (1976).
37. United States v. Blanton, Nos. 81-5643, 81-5644, 81-5645 (6th Cir. Feb. 11,
1983); In re United States ex rel. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 635 F.2d 676, 679 (8th Cir.
1980) (Gibson, J., concurring).
38. New York Times Co. v. United States (The Pentagon Papers case), 403 U.S. 713
(1971).
39. Id. at 715 (Black, J., concurring; joined by Douglas, J.).
1983]
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resents his sensitivity to fundamental constitutional rights, his
deep knowledge and understanding of constitutional issues, and
his diligence. Pace University School of Law was fortunate to
have a man of Justice Hopkins' stature, experience, and ability
serve as its Acting Dean.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss3/5
